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Abstract
Since the seminal work of Henderson (1981), a number of studies ex-
amined the eect of staggered work hours by analyzing models of work
start time choice that consider the trade-o between negative congestion
externalities and positive production externalities. However, these studies
described trac congestion using flow congestion models. This study de-
velops a model of work start time choice with bottleneck congestion and
discloses the intrinsic properties of the model. To this end, this study ex-
tends Henderson’s model to incorporate bottleneck congestion. By utilizing
the properties of a potential game, we characterize equilibrium and optimal
distributions of work start times. We also show that Pigouvian tax/subsidy
policies generally yield multiple equilibria and that the first-best optimum
must be a stable equilibrium under Pigouvian policies, whereas the second-
best optimum in which policymakers cannot eliminate queuing congestion
can be unstable.
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1 Introduction
Urban trac congestion is caused by concentrated demand for travel around the
start of the workday, because firms in central business districts (CBDs) generally
have fixed work schedules and workers start work at the same time. Intro-
ducing staggered work hours (SWH) is a transportation demand management
(TDM)measure for alleviating peak congestion. It iswidely recognized but rarely
implemented, because it may reduce intra-firm communication and productivity
(Wilson, 1988). That is, SWHreduces positive production externalities (agglomer-
ation economies) alongside the negative congestion externalities (agglomeration
diseconomies). Therefore, considering the trade-o between congestion and pro-
ductivity is essential when we examine the eect of TDMmeasures for reducing
peak congestion.
Since the seminal work of Henderson (1981), a number of studies have de-
veloped models of work start time choice that consider trac congestion and
productivity eects; these studies will be discussed in Section 1.1. By examin-
ing the equilibrium and optimal distributions of work start times and optimal
congestion tolls, these studies provide insights into TDM measures. However,
analytical diculties inevitably arising inmodels with agglomeration economies
anddiseconomies (i.e., nonconvexities) limit these studies. Foremost among their
limitations is that they describe trac congestion using flow congestion models,
which are inappropriate for dealingwith peak congestion. Second, although their
models have multiple equilibria, these studies address only a subset—e.g., cases
wherework starting times are continuously distributed or completely clustered—
anddonot examine their stability. Therefore, the equilibriumdistribution ofwork
start times may be unstable and may never emerge in their models. Third, Aka-
matsu et al. (2014b) shows that if we consider models with positive and negative
externalities, social optima can be unstable equilibria under Pigouvian policies,
and a non-optimal stable equilibrium will exist. Therefore, although previous
studies (e.g., Arnott, 2007) investigate the properties of optimum congestion tolls,
social optimum may not be achieved under their congestion tolls.
This study shows that the potential function approach, which utilizes properties
of a potential game, overcomes these limitations and clarifies the intrinsic prop-
erties of amodel of work start time choice with bottleneck congestion. This paper
first develops amodel with production eects and bottleneck congestion by com-
bining Henderson (1981)’s model and the standard bottleneck model (Vickrey,
1969; Hendrickson and Kocur, 1981; Arnott et al., 1990). Similar tomodels in Peer
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and Verhoef (2013) and Gubins and Verhoef (2014), ours assumes that workers
make long-run decisions about work start times and short-run decisions about
day-specific work arrival times. In the short-run, workers choose arrival times
and take work start times as a given; in the long-run, they choose work start
times indirectly through their choice of employer. We then show that the short-
run equilibrium is uniquely determined, whereas the long-run equilibrium is not
unique.
This study examines the local stability of long-run equilibriumbyviewing it as
a Nash equilibrium of a potential game (Sandholm, 2001). In this case, the model
of the long-run choice of work start time admits a potential function, and the
set of long-run equilibria coincides exactly with the set of Karush–Kuhn–Tucker
points for the maximization problem of the potential function. Further, all local
maximizers of the potential function are locally stable long-run equilibria. We
can therefore characterize long-run equilibria and their stability by the shape of
the potential function.
After characterizing the long-run equilibria and their stability, this study in-
vestigates the properties of the first-best and second-best optimal distributions of
work start times and their stability under Pigouvian policies. The first-best opti-
mum is defined as the global maximizer of the social welfare function (workers’
total utility), and the second-best optimum is that under the condition whereby
policymakers cannot control workers’ short-run decisions; that is, the queue at
the bottleneck cannot be eliminated. Thus, dierences between optimumand sta-
ble equilibria are clarified by comparing the shapes of the social welfare function
and the potential function. Furthermore, stability of the first-best and second-best
optima under Pigouvian policies is analyzed by the potential function approach.
This analysis discloses that the first-best optimum must be a stable equilibrium
under Pigouvian policies, whereas the second-best optimum can be unstable.
1.1 Related Literature
Theoretical studies of SWH and its variants have appeared since the benchmark
study by Henderson (1981). Henderson (1981) assumed that all workers in a
city commute from a common residential area to a common CBD along a single
congestible road and that the productivity of a worker at a point in time depends
on the number of workers at work at that time. These two assumptions yield
both trac congestion and productivity eects in his model. He then analyzed
the equilibrium and optimal distributions of work start times. Wilson (1992) and
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Arnott et al. (2005) extended Henderson (1981) by introducing workers’ choices
of residential location and firm heterogeneity, respectively. Arnott (2007) gen-
eralized Henderson’s model and analyzed optimal congestion tolls. Henderson
(1981) and these subsequent studies, however, described trac congestion using
a flow congestion model.
Mun and Yonekawa (2006) and Fosgerau and Small (2014) were the most
successful in considering both production eects and peak-period trac conges-
tion.1 Mun and Yonekawa (2006) formulated a peak-period congestion based
on the standard bottleneck model and developed a model that describes firms’
and workers’ choices to adopt fixed or flextime schedules. They showed that
a situation in which all firms adopt flextime never emerges as equilibrium and
that multiple equilibria could exist. However, due to analytical diculties, they
examined the stability of equilibria only by numerical examples.
Fosgerau and Small (2014) presented a model that introduces bottleneck con-
gestion and productivity eects of work and leisure. They systematically inves-
tigated the properties of equilibrium and optimal tolls. However, their model
presupposed that all workers determine their own work start time, which im-
plies that all firms adopt flextime. This leads to the result that workers’ work start
times are the same as their arrival times at the CBD. Thus, their model describes
only a situation wherein work start times are continuously distributed.
It is noteworthy that the framework of Henderson (1981) is the same as that
of social interaction models (e.g., Beckmann, 1976; Tabuchi, 1986), which study
spatial agglomeration of economic activities. Beckmann (1976) led to numerous
extensions andmodifications (Fujita andOgawa, 1982; Fujita, 1988; Berliant et al.,
2002; Mossay and Picard, 2011; Akamatsu et al., 2014a) that provide approaches
for characterizing equilibrium and social optimum.2 This study modifies one of
these approaches—the potential function approach3 in Akamatsu et al. (2014a)—
and applies it to the model featuring bottleneck congestion. This approach sig-
nificantly simplifies characterizing equilibrium, its stability, and optimum of our
model. By applying the potential function approach, this study then analytically
clarifies the intrinsic properties of the model featuring production eects and
1Sato and Akamatsu (2006) also extended the standard bottleneck model to incorporate the
productivity eect. Although they provided a rigorous framework, their analysis is limited to
a particular set of equilibria, such as cases where work start times are completely clustered and
staggered.
2For comprehensive reviews of these literature, see Fujita and Thisse (2013).
3Methods that utilize the potential function are found in a diverse range of applications (for
reviews, see, e.g., Sandholm, 2010), which includes transportation science (e.g., Beckmann et al.,
1956; Rosenthal, 1973; Sandholm, 2002).
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Figure 1: The monocentric city
bottleneck congestion.
This study proceeds as follows. Section 2 formulates a model of work start
time choice featuring bottleneck congestion and production eects. Section 3
describes the long-run choice of work start time as a potential game and inves-
tigates the uniqueness and stability of the short-run and long-run equilibria by
the potential function approach. Section 4 examines the properties of first-best
and second-best optima and their stability under Pigouvian policies. Section 5
concludes. Proofs omitted in the text are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Basic assumptions
Consider a city that consists of a CBD and a residential area connected by a
single road (Figure 1). This road has a single bottleneck with capacity . All
workers reside in the residential area and commute to the CBD, where all firms
are located. If arrival rates ofworkers at the bottleneck exceed its capacity, a queue
develops. Tomodel queuing congestion, we employ first-in-first-out (FIFO) and a
point queue in which vehicles have no physical length as in standard bottleneck
models (e.g., Vickrey, 1969; Hendrickson and Kocur, 1981; Arnott et al., 1990,
1993).
Each firm chooses its work start time from the feasible set T  ft1; t2;    ; tTg,
where ti = ti 1 +  for all i 2 f2; 3;    ;Tg and  is a positive constant. Since the
length of a workday is assumed to be identical and fixed at H for all firms, each
firm is characterized by its work start time. For convenience, we call the firm
that starts work at time ti “firm i.” We further assume there is an interval in the
workday when all firms begin work, i.e., tT < t1 +H.
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2.1.1 Behavior of workers
The N workers are ex ante identical. Each chooses his or her work start time ti
indirectly by choosing an employer (i.e., a firm i 2 I  f1; 2;    ;Tg to work for)
and the departure time t at the bottleneck to maximize utility ui(t). The utility of
a worker who starts work at ti, whom we call “worker i,” is given by
ui(t) = wi   ci(t); (1)
where wi denotes the wage from firm i and ci(t) denotes commuting cost. The
commuting cost ci(t) of worker iwho departs the bottleneck at time t is expressed
as the sum of queuing time cost at the bottleneck, q(t), schedule delay cost, s(ti t),
and fixed travel time cost, c f :
ci(t) = q(t) + s(ti   t) + c f : (2)
We assume that s(x) is dierentiable, strictly convex, and strictly minimized at
x = 0, and that s0(x)  ds(x)=dx < 1 as in Daganzo (1985), Kuwahara (1990),
and Lindsey (2004). Following Arnott et al. (1990, 1993), we set c f = 0 without
aecting the results of interest.
We consider utility maximization as a sequence of short-run and long-run
optimizations. Specifically, workers in the short-run minimize commuting cost
ci(t) = q(t)+ s(ti   t) by selecting their departure time t taking work start time ti as
given:
min
t
ci(t) = q(t) + s(ti   t): (3)
In the long-run, each worker chooses an employer so as to maximize his/her
utility:
max
i
ui = wi   ci ; (4)
where ci is the short-run equilibrium commuting cost of worker i, determined by
his/her short-run decisions.
2.1.2 Behavior of Firms
All firmsproducehomogeneous goodsunder constant returns to scale technology
and perfect competition, which requires one unit of labor to produce one unit
of output and is chosen as nume´raire. For introduction of the production eect,
this model assumes that the productivity per worker of a firm at time t is linearly
increasing with the total number of workers then on duty. This production eect
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Figure 2: Total number of workers on duty
is represented by the following instantaneous production function:
f (t) = N(t); (5)
where coecient  represents technology of a firm and N(t) is the total number
of workers on duty at time t. The daily output Fi per worker of a firm i is simply
the sum over the workday of the instantaneous output f (t):
Fi =
Z ti+H
ti
f (t)dt =
Z ti+H
ti
N(t)dt: (6)
Note that because ti = ti 1 + , N(t) is represented as follows (Figure 2):
N(t) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
P j
k=1Nk if t 2 [t j; t j+1) 8 j 2 f1; 2;    ;T   1g;
N if t 2 [tT; t1 +H];PT
k= j+1Nk if t 2 (t j +H; t j+1 +H] 8 j 2 f1; 2;    ;T   1g;
(7)
where Ni denotes total number of workers employed by firm i. Under the pro-
duction function defined in (6), each firm chooses its work start time to maximize
profit per worker:
max
i
i = Fi   wi: (8)
Since a firm cannot change its work start time frequently, its choice of work start
time is assumed to be a long-run decision.
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2.2 Short-run and long-run equilibrium conditions
2.2.1 Short-run equilibrium conditions
In the short-run, workers decide only the day-specific departure time t at the
bottleneck, which implies that the number of workersN = (Ni)i2I employed by
firm i 2 I—which we call the distributions of work start times—is assumed to be
given. Therefore, short-run equilibrium conditions coincide with those of the
standard bottleneck model, given by these three conditions:8>>><>>>:c

i  
n
q(t) + s(ti   t)
o
= 0 if ni(t) > 0
ci  
n
q(t) + s(ti   t)
o
 0 if ni(t) = 0
8t; 8i 2 I; (9a)
8>>><>>>:  
P
k nk(t) = 0 if q(t) > 0
  Pk nk(t)  0 if q(t) = 0 8t; (9b)Z
ni(t)dt = Ni 8i 2 I; (9c)
where ni(t) is the number of workers i who arrive at the CBD at time t (i.e., the
arrival rate of workers i at the CBD).
Condition (9a) represents the no-arbitrage condition for the choice of depar-
ture time. This condition means that at the short-run equilibrium, no worker
can reduce commuting cost by changing arrival time at the CBD unilaterally.
Condition (9b) is the capacity constraint of the bottleneck, which requires that
the total departure rate
P
k nk(t) at the bottleneck is equal to the capacity  if there
is a queue; otherwise, the total departure rate is (weakly) lower than . The last
condition (9c) is flow conservation for commuting demand. These conditions
give ni(t), q(t), and ci at short-run equilibrium as functions of the distribution of
work start times,N .
2.2.2 Long-run equilibrium conditions
In the long-run, each worker chooses an employer, and each firm chooses its
work start time. Thus, the long-run equilibrium conditions are represented as8>>><>>>:u
  
n
wi   ci
o
= 0 if Ni > 0
u  
n
wi   ci
o
 0 if Ni = 0
8i 2 I; (10a)
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8>>><>>>:
  
n
Fi   wi
o
= 0 if Ni > 0
  
n
Fi   wi
o
 0 if Ni = 0
8i 2 I; (10b)X
k
Nk = N; (10c)
where u denotes the equilibrium utility, and  is the equilibrium profit which
equals zero because firms in the city are perfectly competitive.
Conditions (10a) and (10b) are the equilibrium conditions for workers’ choice
of firm and firms’ choice of work start time, respectively. Condition (10a) implies
that at long-run equilibrium, each worker has no incentive to change employer
unilaterally. Condition (10b) means that if workers are employed by firm i, the
firm i earns the equilibrium profit  = 0; otherwise, the profit must be less than
zero. Condition (10b) is the conservation law of the population of workers.
We easily show that conditions (10a) and (10b) are rewritten as the following
condition because  = 0.8>>><>>>:u
  
n
Fi(N )   ci (N )
o
= 0 if Ni > 0
u  
n
Fi(N )   ci (N )
o
 0 if Ni = 0
8i 2 I; (11)
where Fi(N ) and ci (N ) are determined by (6) and (9) as functions of the distribu-
tionN of work start times. Therefore, the long-run equilibrium distributionN 
of work start times and utility u are obtained from conditions (10c) and (11).
3 Short-run and Long-run Equilibrium
3.1 Short-run equilibrium
We first characterize short-run equilibrium. Because short-run equilibrium con-
ditions (9) coincide with those of the standard bottleneck model and because the
schedule delay cost function s(x) is strictly convex, the following proposition is
obtained.
Proposition 1. The short-run equilibrium is uniquely determined. Furthermore, work-
ers arrive at and leave a bottleneck in the same order as their work start times. That is,
the first-in-first-work discipline is valid.
Proof. See Smith (1984), Daganzo (1985), Kuwahara (1990), and Lindsey (2004).

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In addition, short-run equilibrium commuting cost ci (N ) has the following
desirable properties, which are useful for investigating the properties of long-run
equilibrium.
Lemma 1. The Jacobian matrix rc(N ) of the short-run equilibrium commuting cost
c(N ) = (ci (N ))i2I is symmetric and positive semidefinite.
Proof. See Appendix. 
3.2 Long-run equilibrium
3.2.1 Potential game
We next characterize long-run equilibrium. For the analysis, we invoke the
properties of a potential game introduced by Monderer and Shapley (1996) and
Sandholm (2001). Because the long-run equilibrium conditions are represented
by (10c) and (11), the model of workers’ long-run choice of work start time can
be viewed as a population game in which the set of players is S  [0;N], the
common action set is I, and the payo vector is u(N ) = (Fi(N )  ci (N ))i2I. As is
evident from the definition, a long-run equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of the
game. Thus, let us denote this game by G = fS;I;ug.
A potential game is defined as a game G that holds the following condition:
there exists a continuously dierentiable function P such that
@P(N )
@Ni
= ui(N ) 8N 2  
8>><>>:N 2 RT+
Xk Nk = N
9>>=>>; ; 8i 2 I; (12)
where P is defined on an open set containing  so that its partial derivative
is well-defined on . The function P is the potential function of the game G.
This condition requires the existence of a function in which gradient rP(N )
equals the payo vector u. As Sandholm (2001) proves, if payos u(N ) are
continuouslydierentiable, this condition is equivalent to the following condition
called externality symmetry:
@ui(N )
@N j
=
@u j(N )
@Ni
8N 2 ; 8i; j 2 I: (13)
We now show that our game G is a potential game. It follows from (6) that
the payo vector u(N ) is represented as
u(N ) = F (N )   c(N ) =  fHE   DgN   c(N ); (14)
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where E is T  T matrix with all elements equal to 1, and D is the symmetric
Toeplitz matrix whose (i; j) element is given by ji  jj. From this and Lemma 1, the
Jacobian matrix ru(N ) of the payo vector u(N ) is symmetric, which implies
that externality symmetry holds in our game. Therefore, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 2. The game G is a potential game with the potential function
P(N ) = P1(N )   P2(N ); (15a)
where P1(N ) and P2(N ) are convex functions such that
rP1(N ) = F (N ); (15b)
rP2(N ) = c(N ): (15c)
Proof. See Appendix. 
The equilibrium of a potential game is characterized with the maximization
problem of the potential function. Let us consider the following problem:
max
N
P(N ) s.t.
X
k
Nk = N; Ni  0 8i 2 I: (16)
Let u be a Lagrange multiplier for the constraint
P
kNk = N. We then can
readily verify that the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions of this problem
are equivalent to long-run equilibrium conditions (10c) and (11). Therefore, the
equilibrium set of the game G exactly coincides with the set of KKT points for
problem (16).
From problem (16), we recognize the trade-o between positive production
externalities (agglomeration economies) and negative congestion externalities
(agglomeration diseconomies) as the trade-o between the convexity of P1(N )
and concavity of  P2(N ). If the concavity of  P2(N ) dominates such that P(N )
is strictly concave, a staggered work hours equilibrium is attained as a unique
equilibrium. On the other hand, if the convexity of P1(N ) dominates, the equi-
librium distributions of work start times would be more clustered. Therefore,
P1(N ) represents positive production externalities, whereas  P2(N ) represents
negative congestion externalities.
This fact suggests that the capacity expansion of the bottleneck may worsen
trac congestion in our model. The mechanism is as follows. The capacity ex-
pansion decreases commuting costs, and thus P2(N ) will be less dominant. This
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may lead tomore clustered distribution of work start times, thereby exacerbating
the bottleneck congestion. Although this paradoxical result does not always arise
in our model, we can show that such a situation actually exists, as discussed in
Section 3.2.4.
3.2.2 Uniqueness
To characterize the long-run equilibrium, we first examine its uniqueness. Since
the KKT points of problem (16) are long-run equilibrium, the uniqueness can be
investigated by checking the shape of the potential function P(N ). Specifically, if
P(N ) is unimodal, the long-run equilibrium isunique; otherwise, it is non-unique.
It follows from Proposition 1 that P(N ) is not generally unimodal because of the
convexity of P1(N ). Thus, we have
Lemma 2. The long-run equilibrium is generally not unique.
It is noteworthy that Lemma 2 does not suggest essentialmultiplicity of equi-
libria because even if all of the equilibrium distributions of work start times
are essentially the same (e.g., completely clustered distributions: (N; 0;    ; 0)>,
(0;N;    ; 0)>, (0; 0;    ;N)>), the number of equilibria is not one. Hence, we next
investigate the essential uniqueness of the long-run equilibrium. For the inves-
tigation, we show a property of the support suppN   fi 2 I j Ni > 0g of the
long-run equilibrium.
Lemma 3. SupposeN  2  is a long-run equilibrium. Then, suppN  2 SC where
SC =
n
fi1; i2;    ; iag  I j a 2 I; i j+1 = i j + 1 8 j 2 [1; a   1];
o
: (17)
Proof. See Appendix. 
Lemma 3 means that the set of work start times such that Ni > 0 is a convex set.
In other words, if we suppose  = 30 (min) and some employees start work at
8:00 and 9:00, there must be workers who start at 8:30.
Because of the symmetry of our model, Lemma 3 implies that if the long-run
equilibrium N  is not full support (i.e., suppN  , I) and N1 = 0, there is a
long-run equilibrium Nˆ  that is essentially the same withN  such that
Nˆ  = PN ; (18)
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where P = (Pi j)i; j2I is the T  T permutation matrix given by
Pi j =
8>>><>>>:1 if j   i = 1 or j   i = 1   T;0 otherwise; (19)
that is, Nˆi = N

i+1 for all i 2 InfTg and NˆT = 0. Furthermore, if we define
the schedule delay cost function s(x) such that s(x) = s( x), there also exists
essentially the same long-run equilibrium N˜  withN  such that
N˜  = RN ; (20)
where R = (Ri j)i; j2I is the T  T permutation which acts as the upside-down
reflection given by
Ri j =
8>>><>>>:1 if i + j = T + 1;0 otherwise: (21)
The essentially identical long-run equilibriaN ; Nˆ ; N˜  satisfy
P(N ) = P(Nˆ ) = P(N˜ ); (22a)
det(r2P(N )) = det(r2P(Nˆ )) = det(r2P(N˜ )); (22b)
where r2P(N ) is the Hessian matrix of P atN  and det(A) is the determinant of
A. Moreover, from the index theorem of Simsek et al. (2007), the set KKT(P;) of
the KKT points of problem (16) (i.e., the set of the long-run equilibria) satisfiesX
N2KKT(P;)
indP(N ) = 1; (23a)
indP(N ) 
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
 1 if det(r2P(N )) < 0;
0 if det(r2P(N )) = 0;
1 if det(r2P(N )) > 0:
(23b)
However, the total value of indices of essentially the same long-run equilibria
cannot be one because of (22b). Therefore, we can obtain the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 3. The long-run equilibrium is essentially non-unique.
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3.2.3 Stability
We next consider the local asymptotic stability of long-run equilibria because our
model generally includes multiple equilibria as shown above. To investigate the
stability of the long-run equilibrium, we need to assume adjustment dynamics
N˙ = V (N ) that maps a distribution of work start times N 0 2  to a set of
Lipschitz paths in  that starts fromN 0. Although we usually consider a specific
evolutionary dynamic for stability analysis, we see that a more general analysis
is possible due to the existence of a potential function. That is, the stability of
equilibria can be characterized under a broad class of dynamics. In particular, we
consider the class of admissible dynamics that satisfies the following conditions:
V (N )  u(N ) > 0 whenever V , 0; (24)
V (N ) = 0 implies thatN is a Nash equilibrium of the game G: (25)
The former condition (24), called positive correlation, requires that out of rest points,
there is a positive correlation between the adjustment dynamics V (N ) and the
payos u(N ). This implies that, under this condition, all Nash equilibria of the
game G are rest points of the adjustment dynamics V (N ).4 The latter condition
(25), calledNash stationarity, asks that every rest points of the adjustment dynam-
ics V (N ) be a Nash equilibrium of the game G. Therefore, under the conditions
(24) and (25), N˙ = V (N ) = 0 if and only ifN is a Nash equilibrium of the game
G. Specific examples of admissible dynamics include the best response dynamic
(Gilboa and Matsui, 1991), the Brown–von Neumann–Nash dynamic (Brown and
von Neumann, 1950), and projection dynamic (Dupuis and Nagurney, 1993).5
Under the admissible dynamics, we can easily characterize the local asymp-
totic stability of Nash equilibria of a potential game because Sandholm (2001)
proves that a Nash equilibrium of a potential game is asymptotically stable under any
admissible dynamics if and only if it locally maximizes an associated potential function.
This implies that we can examine the stability of long-run equilibria only by
checking the shape of the potential function. The following section compares
the stable long-run equilibrium and optimal distributions of work start times by
utilizing this property.
4See Proposition 4.3 of Sandholm (2001).
5See Sandholm (2005a) for more examples.
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Figure 3: Distributions of work start times
3.2.4 A simple example
To demonstrate the usefulness of the potential function approach and to show the
properties of the long-run equilibrium of ourmodel, we analyze themodel under
the simple setting such that T = 2; s(x) = x2 where  is a positive constant. In
this setting, the FIFO principle is satisfied at the short-run equilibrium if N  .
Thus, we suppose that parameters ;N;  satisfy this condition in this example.
In the case that T = 2, the distribution of work start times can be classified
into three patterns (Figure 3):
Pattern 1: work start times are completely clustered.
Pattern 2.1: work start times are staggered, and the rush hour in which queuing
congestion occurs is a single interval.
Pattern 2.2: work start times are staggered, and the rush hour is divided into
two intervals.
Because of s(x) = s( x) in this example, Pattern 2.1 arises only if   N=(2), and
Pattern 2.2 arises only if  > N=(2).
The short-run equilibrium commuting costs c1(N1) and c

2(N1) are obtained as
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functions of N1:
c1(N1) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:

 
N
2
  N  N1
N
!2
if   N
2
;

42
N21 if  >
N
2
;
(26a)
c2(N1) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:

 
N
2
  N1
N
!2
if   N
2
;

42
(N  N1)2 if  > N2:
(26b)
Therefore, the potential function is represented as
P(N1) = P1(N1)   P2(N1); (27a)
P1(N1) = 
(
HN2
2
  N1(N  N1)
)
; (27b)
P2(N1) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
N3
122
+ 
 

N
  1

!
N1(N  N1) if   N2;
N
122

N2   3N1(N  N1)	 if  > N2:
(27c)
Because the potential function is quadratic and the second derivative of the
potential function is given by
@2P(N1)
@N21
=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
2
(
 + 
 

N
  1

!)
if   N
2
;
2
 
   N
42
!
if  >
N
2
;
(28)
the stable and unstable long-run equilibria Ns1;N
u
1 are obtained as follows:8>>><>>>:N
s
1 = 0;N; N
u
1 =
N
2 if
n
 >
N
42 and  >
N
2
o
or
n
 > N

1
   

and   N2
o
;
Ns1 =
N
2 if
n
  N42 and  > N2
o
or
n
  N

1
   

and   N2
o
:
(29)
Figure 4 illustrates the relation between the stable equilibrium and parameters 
and when  = 0:2;  = 1:0, and N = 1:0.
We next show there is a situation in which capacity expansion exacerbates
trac congestion. We consider the case that capacity  is expanded to 1:5
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Figure 4: Parameters and the stable equilibrium (N = 1:0;  = 0:2;  = 1:0)
and the stable equilibrium changes from Pattern 2.2 to Pattern 1 as illustrated in
Figure 4. In this case, the total queuing time costs before and after the capacity
expansion Qb;Qa are given by
Qb =
Z tl1
t f1
n1(t) q(t)dt +
Z tl2
t f2
n2(t) q(t)dt = 
Z tl1
t f1
c1   s(t1   t)dt + 
Z tl2
t f2
c2   s(t2   t)dt
=
n
N1c1 +N2c

2
o
  2
3
8>><>>:
 
N1
2
!3
+
 
N  N1
2
!39>>=>>; = 83
 
N
4
!3
; (30a)
Qa =
Z tli
t fi
ni(t) q(t)dt = 1:5
Z tli
t fi
ci   s(ti   t)dt = Nci   
 
N
3
!3
= 3
 
N
3
!3
;
(30b)
where t fi and t
l
i are the fastest and latest arrival time at the CBD of worker i. This
result clearly indicates that Qb < Qa. That is, the capacity expansion exacerbates
trac congestion.
4 Social Optimum
Because of the positive and negative externalities, the long-run equilibrium is
not generally ecient. Therefore, this section discusses TDM policies such as
SWH and taxation for achieving the optimal distribution of work start times. To
address this issue, we first characterize the social (i.e., first-best) optimum and
the second-best optimum in which policymakers cannot control workers’ short-
run decisions. That is, the queue at the bottleneck cannot be eliminated. We
then analyze the eectiveness of Pigouvian policies for achieving first-best and
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second-best optima.
4.1 First-best optimum
We define the first-best optimum as a state wherein total utility is maximized.
This means that the first-best optimum coincides with a solution of the following
maximization problem:
max
fni(t)g;N
W =W1(N )  W2(fni(t)g) (31a)
s.t.   
X
k2I
nk(t)  0 8t;
Z
ni(t)dt = Ni 8i 2 I; ni(t)  0 8t; 8i 2 I; (31b)
N 2 ; (31c)
whereW1(N ) andW2(fni(t)g) are given by
W1(N ) =
X
k2I
Fk(N )Nk = 2P1(N ); (32a)
W2(fni(t)g) =
X
k2I
Z
nk(t)

q(t) + s(tk   t)	 dt: (32b)
As is the case with P1 and P2, W1 and W2 represent the strength of positive
production externalities and negative congestion externalities, respectively. W1
denotes workers’ total wages in the city andW2 is total commuting cost.
The queue at the bottleneck is completely eliminated at the first-best optimum
as proved in studies involving standard bottleneck models (e.g., Vickrey, 1969;
Hendrickson and Kocur, 1981; Arnott et al., 1990, 1993, 1994). It follows from this
thatW2(fni(t)g) can be rewritten as
W˜2(fni(t)g) =
X
k2I
Z
nk(t) s(tk   t)dt; (33)
which denotes the total schedule delay costs in the city. It is noteworthy that
W˜2(fni(t)g) coincides with the objective function of the optimization problem that
is equivalent to the equilibrium conditions of the standard bottleneckmodel (Iryo
and Yoshii, 2007). Specifically, we obtain fni(t)g at the short-run equilibrium by
solving the following minimization problem:
min
fni(t)g
W˜2(fni(t)g) s.t. (31b) (34)
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Furthermore, this problem has the following useful property:
Lemma 4. Z(N ) = minfni(t)g W˜2(fni(t)g) s.t. (31b) satisfies
rZ(N ) = c(N ): (35)
Proof. See Appendix. 
Lemma 4 indicates that P2(N ) is given by Z(N ). Therefore the distribution N o
of work start times at the first-best optimum is the solution of the following
problem.
Lemma 5. The distributionN o of work start times at the first-best optimum is obtained
by solving the following maximization problem.
max
N
P(N ) + P1(N ) s.t. N 2 : (36)
Lemma 5 implies that the positive production externalities should be strength-
ened to achieve the first-best optimum because the objective function of problem
(36) is the sum of the potential function P(N ) and the convex function P1(N ),
which represents the production externalities. Therefore, we have the following
propositon.
Proposition 4. The first-best optimal distributionN o of work start times is more clus-
tered than the stable equilibriumN s.
4.2 Second-best optimum
Although there are numerous eective schemes for managing trac conges-
tion, including dynamic congestion pricing (e.g., Yang andHuang, 2005; Tsekeris
and Voß, 2008; de Palma and Lindsey, 2011) and tradable permits schemes (e.g.,
Verhoef et al., 1997; Yang and Wang, 2011; Wada and Akamatsu, 2013), eliminat-
ing queuing congestion has been dicult thus far. Thus, we next consider the
second-best optimum wherein policymakers cannot control workers’ short-run
behaviors. That is, the queue at the bottleneck cannot be eliminated. The dis-
tribution Nˆ o of work start times at the second-best optimum is defined as the
solution of the following problem:
max
N
Wˆ(N ) = Wˆ1(N )   Wˆ2(N ) s.t. N 2 ; (37)
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where Wˆ1(N ) and Wˆ2(N ) are total wage and commuting cost, respectively, which
are expressed as
Wˆ1(N ) =W1(N ) =
X
k2I
Fk(N )Nk; (38a)
Wˆ2(N ) =
X
k2I
ck(N )Nk: (38b)
To compare the second-best optimum and the stable equilibrium, we examine
the shape of Wˆ(N ) from its Hessian matrix. Because the Hessian matrix of Wˆ(N )
is given by
r2Wˆ(N ) = 2r2P(N )  
X
k2I
Nkr2ck(N ); (39)
we see that only  Pk2INkr2ck(N ) makes a dierence in the shape of Wˆ(N ) and
P(N ). This yields the following proposition.
Proposition 5. The second-best optimal distribution of work start times is more clustered
than the stable equilibrium if the matrix  Pk2INkr2ck(N ) is positive definite, and it is
more staggered than the stable equilibrium if  Pk2INkr2ck(N ) is negative definite.
Note here that in many cases  Pk2INkr2ck(N ) is expected to be negative definite
because the schedule delay cost function s(x) is assumed to be convex. In fact,
if the number of intervals of rush hour at the second-best optimum equals the
cardinality of supp Nˆ o (i.e., rush hour is completely separated), ci (N ) must be
convex due to the convexity of s(x). Therefore, Nˆ o is generally expected to be
more staggered than N s, which implies that the TDM policies for staggering
work hours are generally eective in the case where queuing congestion cannot
be eliminated.
4.3 Pigouvian policies
We next discuss tax/subsidy policies that attain the first-best and second-best
optima as a stable long-run equilibria. To achieve the optimum, we generally
consider Pigouvian policies, such as congestion tolls. We do so because the
optimal state is supported as an equilibrium by imposing such policies that
workers are responsible for their externalities at the optimum. However, as
mentioned in the introduction, Akamatsu et al. (2014b) shows that ifwe consider a
modelwith positive andnegative externalities, social optimumcanbe anunstable
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equilibrium under Pigouvian policies and a non-optimal stable equilibrium will
exist. This implies the possibility that the social optimum cannot be achieved
only by Pigouvian policies in our model. Therefore, this section analyzes the
stability of the first-best and second-best optima under Pigouvian policies.
4.3.1 First-best optimum
Since themodel ofworkers’ short-run decisions involves no positive externalities,
we assume the queue is completely eliminated by some schemes and examine
whether the first-best optimal distribution of work start times is a stable long-run
equilibrium under Pigouvian policies. We consider a Pigouvian policy that intro-
duces tax/subsidy p = (pi)i2I to workers in order to attain the first-best optimum,
which we call the Pigouvian first-best policy. It follows from Proposition 2 and
Lemma 5 that p is given by
p = F (N o) = fHE   DgN o: (40)
Under the Pigouvian first-best policy, our model is viewed as a potential game
GP = fS;I;uPg, where uP(N ) = u(N ) + p, because there exists the following
potential function:
PP(N ) = P(N ) + p N : (41)
The KKT conditions of the maximization problem of the potential function
PP(N ) subject toN 2  is given by8>>><>>>:u
  
n
Fi(N o) + Fi(N )   ci (N )g = 0 if Ni > 0
u  
n
Fi(N o) + Fi(N )   ci (N )g  0 if Ni = 0
8i 2 I; (42a)X
k2I
Nk = N: (42b)
This implies that the first-best optimum N o must be a Nash equilibrium of the
gameGP because the first-order conditions (i.e., optimality conditions) of problem
(36) is represented as8>>><>>>:w
  
n
2Fi(N )   ci (N )g = 0 if Ni > 0
w  
n
2Fi(N )   ci (N )g  0 if Ni = 0
8i 2 I; (43a)
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X
k2I
Nk = N: (43b)
However, this policy does notwork for stabilizing the first-best optimumbecause
introduction of the Pigouvian first-best policy cannot change the Hessian matrix
of the potential function. That is, r2P(N ) equals r2PP(N ). Note that because
r2P(N ) = r2PP(N ), N o is stable under the Pigouvian first-best policy when
N o =N s, andN o is unstable ifN o =N u.
Since P is not generally unimodal, the equilibrium of the gameGP is generally
non-unique. Thus, we examine the stability of the first-best optimum N o by
looking at the shape of PP at the neighborhood ofN o. For this examination, leto
be the set of the neighborhood ofN o in . Then,N o is locally and asymptotically
stable (i.e., a local maximizer of PP) if and only if
(N  N o)>
n
r2PP(N o)
o
(N  N o) < 0 8N 2 o; (44)
otherwise,N o is unstable. BecauseN o is the global maximizer ofW andr2P1(N )
is positive definite, we have
0 > (N  N o)>r2W(N o)(N  N o) = (N  N o)>
n
r2P(N o) + r2P1(N o)
o
(N  N o)
> (N  N o)>r2P(N o)(N  N o) = (N  N o)>r2PP(N o)(N  N o) 8N 2 o:
(45)
This yields the following proposition.
Proposition 6. The first-best optimal distribution of work start times is stable under the
Pigouvian first-best policy.
4.3.2 Second-best optimum
We next consider Pigouvian policy to attain the second-best optimum, which we
call the Pigouvian second-best policy.
The Pigouvian second-best policy is to introduce tax/subsidy pˆ so that Nˆ o is
a Nash equilibrium of the game GˆP = fS;I; uˆP = u + pˆg, where
pˆ = r2P(Nˆ o)Nˆ o: (46)
As stated above, this policymakes Nˆ o a long-run equilibrium but cannot stabilize
it. Thus, we check its stability.
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For this, we consider a potential game GˆP with the potential function
PˆP(N ) = P(N ) + pˆ N : (47)
Because the model of workers’ long-run decisions is viewed as the game GˆP, the
second-best optimum Nˆ o is stable if and only if
Nˆ   Nˆ o
> nr2PˆP(Nˆ o)o Nˆ   Nˆ o
=
1
2

Nˆ   Nˆ o
> 8>><>>:r2Wˆ(Nˆ o) +X
k2I
Nˆokr2ck(Nˆ o)
9>>=>>; Nˆ   Nˆ o < 0 8Nˆ 2 ˆo; (48)
where ˆo is the set of the neighborhood of Nˆ o in . Therefore, we have the
following proposition.
Proposition 7. The second-best optimum Nˆ o is a stable equilibriumunder the Pigouvian
second-best policy if and only if
Nˆ   Nˆ o
> nr2Wˆ(Nˆ o)o Nˆ   Nˆ o
<

Nˆ   Nˆ o
> 8>><>>: X
k2I
Nˆokr2ck(Nˆ o)
9>>=>>; Nˆ   Nˆ o 8Nˆ 2 ˆo; (49)
otherwise, the second-best optimum Nˆ o is unstable.
Note that the condition (49) can be violated as shown in Section 4.3.3, and thus
the Pigouvian second-best policy can be ineective. This means that policymak-
ers need to implement other policies for stabilizing optimal distribution of work
start times. One of the eective policy is evolutionary implementation of Pigouvian
policies introduced by Sandholm (2002, 2005b). This policy is to impose the values
of externalities evaluated at the current state, rather than the optimal state. We
briefly show the eectiveness of this policy. If the current state is N 2 , the
tax/subsidy p˜(N ) to workers is
p˜(N ) = r2P(N )N : (50)
Let G˜P = fS;I; u˜ = u + p˜g be a population game under this policy. We then
can show that the game G˜P is a potential game for which Wˆ(N ) is the potential
function. This implies that the second-best optimal distribution of work start
times Nˆ o must be a stable equilibrium under the policy (50) because Nˆ o globally
maximizes Wˆ(N ).
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4.3.3 A simple example revisited
To show concretely the properties of the first-best optimum, second-best opti-
mum, and Pigouvian policies, we revisit the simple example presented in Section
3.2.4. In this simple case,W and Wˆ are represented as functions of N1.
W(N1) = 2P1(N1)   P2(N1); (51)
Wˆ(N1) = 2P1(N1)   Pˆ2(N1) (52)
Pˆ2(N1) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
N
42

N2   3N1(N  N1)	 if  > N2;
N3
42
  2
N
 
N

  
2
!
N1(N  N1) if   N2:
(53)
BecauseW and Wˆ are quadratic, the first-best and second-best optima No1; Nˆ
o
1 are
easily obtained.8>>><>>>:N
o
1 = 0;N; if
n
 >
N
82 and  >
N
2
o
or
n
 > N

1
   2

and   N2
o
;
No1 =
N
2 if
n
  N82 and  > N2
o
or
n
  N

1
   2

and   N2
o
;
(54a)8>>><>>>:Nˆ
o
1 = 0;N; if
n
 >
3N
82 and  >
N
2
o
or
n
 > 2N

1
   

and   N2
o
;
Nˆo1 =
N
2 if
n
  3N82 and  > N2
o
or
n
  2N

1
   

and   N2
o
:
(54b)
It follows from (29) and (54) that the first-best optimal distribution of work start
times is more clustered than the stable equilibrium, and that the second-best
optimum is more staggered, which is illustrated by the red areas in Figure 5.
Both are consistent with Propositions 4 and 5.
These results also indicate that Nˆo1 can be equal toN
u
1 . That is, the second-best
optimum can be unstable under the Pigouvian second-best policy. Therefore,
we have to carefully implement Pigouvian policies for alleviating trac conges-
tion, such as a congestion toll, if policymakers cannot control workers’ short-run
decisions.
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Figure 5: Dierences between the stable equilibrium and the optimum (N =
1:0;  = 0:2;  = 1:0)
5 Conclusions
This study presented a model of work start time choice with bottleneck con-
gestion and an analytical approach utilizing the properties of a potential game.
By using this approach, we showed that equilibrium distribution of work start
times is essentially non-unique and that stability of equilibria can be examined
by checking the shape of the potential function. Furthermore, by comparing the
social welfare function and the potential function, we clarified that if policymak-
ers can eliminate the queue at the bottleneck, distribution of work start times
should be more clustered than the stable equilibrium; otherwise, it should be
more staggered. After characterizing the equilibrium and optimal distribution
of work start times, we investigated the eectiveness of tax/subsidy policies and
pointed out that if the queue cannot eliminated, Pigouvian tax/subsidy policies
can be ineective for achieving a optimum.
The analytical approach presented herein can be used not only for a model of
work start time choice but also for a wide class of models considering bottleneck
congestion. For instance, this approach is applicable to models of location choice
with bottleneck congestion, such asArnott (1998). Therefore, itwould be valuable
for future research to investigate the intrinsic properties of other models by
applying the approach.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Let t fi and t
l
i be the fastest and latest arrival time at CBD of worker i. It follows
from Proposition 1 (i.e., uniqueness of the short-run equilibrium and the first-in-
first-work discipline) that t fi and t
l
i satisfy
tli 1  t fi 8i 2 Inf1g: (55)
Let Ii  f j j q(t) > 0 8t 2 [ti; t j] or [t j; ti]g. Then, we can say that the short-run
equilibrium commuting cost of worker i is aected by behavior of worker j 2 Ii.
That is,
@ci (N )
@N j
, 0 8 j 2 Ii: (56)
Note that if there exists t 2 [ti; t j] or [t j; ti] such that q(t) = 0, Lindsey (2004) proves
that
@ci (N )
@N j
=
@cj(N )
@Ni
= 0 8 j < Ii: (57)
Thus, for the proof of the symmetry of rc(N ), we will show here that
@ci (N )
@N j
=
@cj(N )
@Ni
8 j 2 Ii: (58)
The short-run equilibrium commuting cost ci (N ) of worker i is expressed as
ci (N ) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
s(t fi ) = q(t
l
i) + s(t
l
i) if i = ai  minIi;
q(t fi ) + s(t
f
i ) = s(t
l
i) if i = bi  maxIi;
q(t fi ) + s(t
f
i ) = q(t
l
i) + s(t
l
i) otherwise;
(59)
where t fi  ti   t fi and tli  ti   tli, because q(t fai) = q(tlbi) = 0. This is rewritten as
ci (N ) = q(t
f
i ) + s(t
f
i ) =
n
q(t fi 1) + s(t
f
i 1)   s(tli 1)
o
+ s(t fi ) =   
=
i 1X
k=ai
n
s(t fk )   s(tlk)
o
+ s(t fi ): (60)
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Furthermore, t fi and t
l
i are represented as functions of t
f
ai andN :
t fi = t
f
ai +
P j 1
k=ai
Nk

; tli = t
f
ai +
P j
k=ai
Nk

: (61)
Therefore, dierentiating ci (N ) with respect to Ni, we have
@ci (N )
@N j
=
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
  @t
f
ai
@N j
2666664 i 1X
k=ai
n
s0(t fk )   s0(tlk)
o
+ s0(t fi )
3777775   1
26666664 s0(tlj) + i 1X
k= j+1
n
s0(t fk )   s0(tlk)
o
+ s0(t fi )
37777775 if i > j;
  @t
f
ai
@N j
2666664 i 1X
k=ai
n
s0(t fk )   s0(tlk)
o
+ s0(t fi )
3777775 if i  j;
(62)
where the prime denotes dierentiation. In addition, it follows from q(tbi) = 0
that X
i2Ii
n
s(t fk )   s(tlk)
o
= 0: (63)
Dierentiating both side of (63) with respect to N j, we obtain
  @t
f
ai
@N j
2666664X
k2Ii
n
s0(t fk )   s0(tlk)
o3777775   1
26666664 s0(tlj) + biX
k= j+1
n
s0(t fk )   s0(tlk)
o37777775 = 0: (64)
Substituting this into (62) yields
@ci (N )
@N j
=
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
  @t
f
ai
@Ni
2666664 j 1X
k=ai
n
s0(t fk )   s0(tlk)
o
+ s0(t fj )
3777775 if i > j;
  @t
f
ai
@N j
2666664 i 1X
k=ai
n
s0(t fk )   s0(tlk)
o
+ s0(t fi )
3777775 if i  j;
(65)
which shows the symmetry of rc(N ).
We next prove positive definiteness of rc(N ). Substituting (64) into (65), we
obtain
@ci (N )
@N j
=
@cj(N )
@Ni
=
S fi jS
l
ji
Si
; (66a)
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S fi j  s0(t fj ) +
j 1X
k=ai
n
s0(t fk )   s0(tlk)
o
> 0; (66b)
Sli j   s0(tlj) +
biX
k= j+1
n
s0(t fk )   s0(tlk)
o
> 0; (66c)
Si 
X
k2Si
n
s0(t fk )   s0(tlk)
o
> 0: (66d)
Note that since s0(tli)+s0(t fi+1) > 0 for all i; i+1 2 Ii, s0(t fai) > 0, and s0(tlbi) < 0,
Si, S
f
i j, S
l
i j are all positive. Thus, (66a) can be rewritten as follows:
rc(N ) = LL>; (67)
whereL = (Li j)i; j2I is a lower triangularmatrix, the (i; j) entries of which are given
by
Li j =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
Slii
vut
1
Si
8>>><>>>:S
f
i j
Sli j
 
S fi( j 1)
Sli( j 1)
9>>>=>>>; > 0 if i  j; j 2 Ii;
0 otherwise;
(68)
where S fi0 = 0;S
l
i0 , 0. This implies that rc(N ) has a Cholesky decomposition,
and thus rc(N ) is positive semidefinite6.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Since it is apparent that P(N ) is the potential function of the game G, we prove
here that the convexity of P1(N ) and P2(N ).
We first show that P1(N ) is convex. The Hessian matrix of P1(N ) is given by
r2P1(N ) =  fHE   Dg : (69)
6For the proof, see, e.g., Corollary 7.2.9 of Horn and Johnson (2013).
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Its inverse can be directly computed as
n
r2P1(N )
o 1
=
1

2666666666666666666666666664
  0:5 
 0:5 1  0:5 O
 0:5 1  0:5
: : : : : : : : :
O  0:5 1  0:5
  0:5 
3777777777777777777777777775
; (70)
   + 0:5; (71)
  
2f2H   (T   1)g : (72)
Then, by Gershgorin circle theorem,7 every eigenvalue fr2P1(N )g 1 of fr2P1(N )g 1
lies in
0  fr2P1(N )g 1  maxf1 + 2; 2g: (73)
It follows from this that every eigenvalue of r2P1(N ) is also nonnegative. This
shows the convexity of P1(N ).
P2(N ) is also convex, because r2P2(N ) = rc(N ) is positive semidefinite as
shown in Lemma 1.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Suppose to the contrary that there exists an equilibrium N  in which, for some
i; j 2 suppN  with j   i  2, Nk = 0 (i.e., k < suppN ) for all i < k < j, and let
di j  ji   jj, N˜ k 
Pk
m=1Nm, and N˜+k 
PT
m=kNm. Then, for k 2 (i; j),
ui = u j  uk; (74a)
ui   u j = di j
n
N˜ k   N˜+k
o
  ci (N ) + cj(N ) = 0; (74b)
ui   uk = dik
n
N˜ k   N˜+k
o
  ci (N ) + ck(N )  0; (74c)
u j   uk = dkj
n
N˜+k   N˜ k
o
  cj(N ) + ck(N )  0: (74d)
If N˜ k  N˜+k , we have ci (N )  cj(N ) > 0 and ck(N )  cj(N ) > 0 from (74b) and
(74d). This implies that q(tk) > 0, i.e., tli > tk. Furthermore, substituting (74b) into
7For the details of this theorem, see, e.g., Strang (2006) and Horn and Johnson (2013).
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(74d) yields
u j   uk =  dikdi j c

j(N )  
dkj
di j
ci (N ) + c

k(N ) =  
dik
di j
s(t fj )  
dkj
di j
s(tli) + s(tk   tli): (75)
Since s(x) is convex, (75) is rewritten as
u j   uk 
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
dik
di j
n
 s(t fj ) + s(tk   tli) + dkjs0(tk   tli)
o
< 0 if tli < t j;
dik
di j
n
s(tk   tli)   s(t fj )
o
+
dkj
di j
n
s(tk   tli)   s(tli)
o
< 0 if tli  t j:
(76)
If N˜ k < N˜
+
k , we can easily show that ui   uk < 0 by the same procedure. But this
contradicts i; j 2 suppN  (i.e., ui = u j  uk).
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
It follows from Proposition 1 (uniqueness of the short-run equilibrium and the
first-in-first-work discipline) that Z(N ) is represented as
Z(N ) =
X
k2I
Z tlk
t fk
s(tk   t)dt: (77)
Since t fi and t
l
i is given by (61), dierentiation of Z(N ) with respect to Ni yields
@Z(N )
@Ni
= s(tli) +
biX
k=i+1
n
 s(t fk ) + s(tlk)
o
+ 
@t fai
@Ni
X
k2Ii
n
 s(t fk ) + s(tlk)
o
: (78)
Substituting (62), we have
@Z(N )
@Ni
=
i 1X
k=ai
n
s(t fk )   s(tlk)
o
+ s(t fi ) = c

i (N ): (79)
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